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 1 The legal frameworks of the decentralisation 
Following the systemic change the first really significant legal document passed 
by the newly elected parliament was the Act on Local Governments. The 
preparation of the Act progressed in the crossfire of serious political debates, 
since all political groups realised that the act will fundamentally impact the 
future power exercise. Despite of the number of amendments and debates the 
act was passed with a significant majority.  
The Act meets international standards as far as its spirit and liberalism are 
concerned and at the same time, has brought a dramatic change in the structure 
of Hungarian public administration. The Act declares the right to self-
governance, as the collective right of citizens living within one locality, 
therefore the settlement became the key element in the local government system. 
It is conspicuous in both the Act on Local Governments and the Constitution 
that the legislature strove at creating the guarantees of the local governments' 
autonomy in terms of structure and decision-making. This is reflected by the 
enumeration of the basic rights of local governments, the declaration of equity 
in terms of their legal status. The regulation of the relationship to the state as 
well as the weak control of lawfulness over the local governments seem to point 
to the fact that the essence of the Hungarian self-governmental model is 
autonomy and independence from state influence and hierarchy. The choice of 
value by the legislator in relation to the local government model was mainly 
motivated by political intentions, and therefore besides the guarantees of 
democracy and independence the aspects of efficiency and the public 
administrative rationality were rather neglected. (Stewart, J.–Stoker, G. 1995). 
Once the structure and labour guarantees thereof prevail, this model can provide 
all advantages. However, legislation and administration following the enactment 
of the Act on Local Governments pointed out that despite of all the liberalism of 
the regulations the model of self-government with its legal guarantees of free 
decision-making alone can not ensure political and power decentralisation. The 
parliamentary and governmental decisions and measures of the previous years 
in many respects run counter to the original logic of self-governance, despite of 
the fact that from the aspect of the legal form there was no interference with the 
competencies and decisions of the local governments. 
The constitutional guarantees of the basic rights of local governments: 
• The Act on Local Governments declares the relative autonomy of local 
governments, stating that all decisions made on local matters are final and 
therefore can only be revised for lawfulness. The provision stating that 
local public matters can be remitted to other central government offices 
only in exceptional cases is of great constitutional importance. This 
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 regulation ensures the dominance of the local governmental sector within 
the public administration. Although the Act on Local Governments 
stipulates that “local affairs may be delegated to other organisations only 
exceptionally”, no definition of “local affairs” or their minimal content is 
provided, therefore no legal hindrances are set to limit the expansion of 
the deconcentrated state administration. 
• The Act grants great freedom to the local governments to establish 
organisations, to pass decrees, join alliances for the protection of common 
their interests and other types of associations. 
• The Act defines the compulsory tasks of the local governments, 
specifying the government support they are granted to and indicating that 
larger local governments may be assigned with more tasks. Distinguishing 
between the tasks of local governments and the state administration, the 
Act provides that the tasks of local governments may only be defined by 
parliamentary acts. The liberal spirit of the Act is well illustrated by the 
fact that it allows a fairly liberal distribution of local governmental 
functions on a voluntary basis, being obviously more favourable to 
municipalities versus the counties. 
• The declaration of the equal rights of local governments and the 
subsidiary status of the counties was important for the legislator. This 
principle put an end to the previous, century-long tradition granting more 
power to the 19 counties, which used to be the only territorial tier of the 
Hungarian State. In the Soviet-type council system between 1950–1990, 
the power between the representative body and public administration was 
not divided. The soviet-type council system incorporated the various tasks 
from safeguarding of local interests, through the supervision of companies 
and management of services, to the administration by public authorities, 
placing all these under the control of elected bodies. The socialist state did 
not “distrust” county councils, which were considered as both the agency 
of the central state and representative of the municipal interests. The 
central state therefore did not care to develop a deconcentrated system of 
public administration, since it had control over the whole mechanism once 
the territorial governance as a whole had been incorporated into the 
prevailing hierarchy. This means that the new model of local government 
instituted in 1990 inherited a completely uniform system of territorial 
governance. As to this legacy, a further specific feature of the previous 40 
years is to be mentioned. The Soviet–type council system in Hungary 
functioned not only in a uniform but also in a territorially integrated, 
concentrated organisational mechanism. This was valid for councils in 
tiny villages, the districts (settlements in the neighbourhood of towns and 
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 the towns themselves) and for the administration of towns as well. The 
high level of integration – it was said – improved efficiency and the profi-
ciency of public administration but at the same time, resulted in a huge 
“deficit in democracy” and made representation within the councils just a 
formality. The focal point was the county council controlling the activities 
of local councils in several ways ranging from legal supervision, through 
the direction of public administration, to acting as a forum of appeal and 
allocating of financial resources and a major investor in the service 
provision. 
2 The structure of the model 
The above facts led to the mentioned characteristic features of the Hungarian 
local governmental model, which made conscious efforts to eliminate all the 
compulsory and hierarchical aspects of integration.  
There are four aspects in which the Hungarian system of local governments 
differs from the Western European trends: too small municipalities, too weak 
counties, to large and powerful state sector in the territorial tier and too few 
associations. 
2.1 Fragmented municipalities 
As first, due to the aspiration of small villages to absolute self-rule and 
autonomy these local authorities are highly fragmented. The more than three 
thousand autonomous decision-making bodies in the wake of the Act on Local 
Governments replaced formerly integrated 1600 local authorities. Over 35 per 
cent of the local authorities have less than 500 inhabitants. The average-size 
local government has 3,400 inhabitants, which is below the European average. 
There are also countries with more fragmented local authority systems in 
Europe i.e. France and Greece, Austria shows similar figures to Hungary but the 
majority of the European countries operate with much larger local authorities. 
The average size in Germany is 7400; in Poland 15,800; in the Netherlands 
23,200 and in the UK where village authorities were attached to the towns the 
average local government caters for a population of 129,000. These high 
population figures are the result of the administrative contractions of the 1960s 
and 1970s, which were aimed at making public administration more efficient 
and economic. Today, in Europe (in the Scandinavian countries, in Germany, in 
the Benelux countries and in Great Britain, too) there are far less local 
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 authorities than in 1950 (Norton, A. 1994). It is only in Hungary where the 
situation of 1950 was re-established. The process by which the number of 
Hungarian local authorities doubled within a single year (1990) is unique in 
Europe. The Act enabled the settlements, which maintained their original name 
to elect their local body independent from their size. The newly elected local 
government of course bears the totality of local governmental rights, may set up 
its own office or establish institutions, etc. This disintegration process runs 
counter to the European trends and is continuing nowadays: (Table 1–2) 
communities still detach themselves from the municipalities. Due to the 
fragmentation, the functioning of the administrative and institutional system is 
horrifying expensive and operates in many municipalities with low proficiency. 
The social–psychological explanation for the disintegration prior to 
independence is understandable; it is not only in local politics that sentiments 
dominate rationality (Pálné Kovács, I. 1993). Local authorities in some 
instances foster these ambitions through the distribution and financial 
mechanisms and do not try to channel local administration into reasonable 
framework by co-ordinate means. 
2.2 Weak meso-tier 
The second feature of the Hungarian model is the loss of importance of the 
county self-governance. The 1990 Act on Local Governments states that the 
county may assume only those functions, which the municipalities cannot be 
obliged to perform or refuse to assume (“subsidiarity”). The disadvantage to 
county assemblies obviously declared by the constitution from the very 
beginning (Figure 1):  
If we consider first of all the elections as the general basis of local 
governmental legitimacy we will see the following: In course of the first 
elections county assemblies were elected indirectly by electors. Therefore they 
had only secondary legitimacy deriving from the municipalities. Although the 
county – in this interpretation – should have functioned as a representative body 
of local governments, it was exactly its relationship to local governments, which 
was not properly defined. First of all, not all of the local governments were 
represented in the county assembly and this was particularly true for the 
counties with a high number of tiny villages. Furthermore, the law included no 
provisions for the direct relationship between county and municipalities while 
taking great care not to restrict the autonomy of the settlement in any way. 
The inferiority of the county-level is also expressed in the division of tasks 
and responsibilities. The county was granted tasks covering larger geographic 
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 areas or the whole county while the local government of any settlement may 
assume the same tasks on its own or in co-operation with other local 
governments. The municipalities have the right to delegate tasks or institutions 
supplying larger districts with their arbitrary decision to the county. It means, 
that the functions and competencies of the counties can change in specie and 
time and the continuous modifications depend on the unilateral decisions of 
local governments, which may curtail or delegate the task. The destiny and the 
“owner” of the institutions with district tasks are therefore uncertain. 
Table 1 
Main data on local governments 1 January 1992, 1998, 2000 
Year Local 
governments 
Local govern-
ments with 
single offices 
Villages bound 
to notary (com-
mon) districts 
Notary-district seats  
located in 
 Number 
District 
(common) 
notary 
offices Cities Large 
villages 
Villages 
1992 3092  1439 506    
1998 3154 1759 1395 505 28 35 436 
2000 3158 1762 1396 536 29 36 471 
Source: The Register of Names of Localities of the Hungarian Republic, 1997. Budapest, Central 
Statistical Office. 
Table 2 
Number and population of settlements by population size-groups, 
1 January 1997 and 2000 
Population size-groups Number of settlements Percentage distribution of the 
population 
  1997 2000 1997 2000 
– 499 1 009 1 032 2.7 2.8 
500 – 999 703 687 5.1 5.0 
1 000 – 1 999 652 655 9.2 9.4 
2 000 – 4 999 491 483 14.4 14.4 
5 000 – 9 999 135 138 9.2 9.5 
10 000 – 49 999 116 115 22.4 22.0 
50 000 – 99 999 11 12 7.0 7.5 
100 000 – > 9 9 30.0 29.4 
Total   3 126 3 131 100.0 100.0 
Source: Territorial Statistical Annual, 1996. Budapest, Central Statistical Office. 
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 The third point is that the activities of the county-level government are “ab 
ovo” restricted by the definition of the legal status of towns with county rank. 
The Hungarian Parliament decided the establishment of 23 towns of county 
rank. The Act on Local Governments granted the right to the towns with county 
rank (i.e. all towns with a population of more than 50,000 or smaller if they are 
county seats, and therefore their number exceeds that of counties), to undertake 
county–tier competencies within their own geographic area. Towns with county 
rank do not have representation in the county assembly and there is no co-
ordination between them, thus county assemblies represent only small 
municipalities and towns. Towns with county rank function parallel to the 
county assemblies. This parallel functioning complicates the administration of 
county-level services and the formulation of global developmental objectives 
for the entire county is fairly difficult and probably over dimensioned. Despite 
the lopsided operation of counties the government did not encourage the 
partnership. As a result of the division of interests within the local governmental 
system the measures of centralisation and delegation of interests could be 
passed practically without any limitations. 
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 Figure 1 
Map of public administration in 
Hungary
Key: 1– country borders, 2 – county borders, 3 – county seat, 4 – town with county rank 
2.3 Expanding deconcentrated state administration  
The state, ever since it established the formal–legal autonomy of local govern-
ments in decision–making, has never given up the ambition to restrict this 
autonomy as much as possible. The division of labour between local 
governments and state organisations and the regulation of the means for 
implementation of local government tasks were mainly regulated by simple 
laws and governmental decrees, therefore the Parliament lost control and 
influence on the process. Although the government did not diminish the 
independence of decision–making and the organisational autonomy of the local 
authorities, it continuously narrowed the scope of decision-making by taking 
over a significant part of local and territorial public affairs. The strengthening of 
the deconcentrated public administration took place mainly at the expense of the 
county assembly. The unhealthy degree of the Hungarian deconcentration can 
be explained in different ways.  
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 It is typical that central government considers centralisation as the ideal form 
of implementing tasks. Thus it is a Hungarian speciality that this centralisation 
tendency cannot be limited either by the legal regulation of the Constitution, or 
by the channels of interests of county and local governments. Essentially, there 
is no public legal guarantee of state construction and operation progressing 
towards political decentralisation. 
Another hothead of deconcentration is the structure and model of the 
national government whereby individual branches represent a greater weight 
than the complex interest of governments as collective bodies. A blatant 
example of this is that the ministries were provided with almost unlimited right 
to create their own deconcentrated sectoral structure subordinated to their 
organisational interests. Almost all ministries made the most of this possibility. 
The disperse structure was built first on the former county council 
administrational branches after the local elections. Therefore land, labour, 
public health, consumer and fire control administration fell under the auspices 
of the relevant ministries. The role of the former financial and planning 
departments of county councils for example was taken over by agencies 
subordinated to the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Finance. Offices 
and agencies such as the compensation offices and property transfer 
committees, etc. were set up to cater for temporary tasks. In the first four years 
following the systemic change, more than ten new types of deconcentrated 
organs were created, bringing the total number of state regional agency types up 
to almost forty, in community, county, and regional levels (Figure 2). 
 As creating these organisations, the national government was not forced to 
consider whether it was financially or professionally feasible to set up a new 
organisation responsible for one single task. Arguments were always ready: on 
the basis  
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 Figure 2 
 Central and Regional Public Administration in Hungary in 1994 
Ministries Their regional organs  
(in each county or region) 
 • Ministry of Home Affairs 
  • Refugee Office 
• Public Administration Office 
• Financial and Administrative Information Service 
• Fire Service 
 • Ministry of Agriculture 
  • Veterinary Service 
• Institute for Species Experiments and Dairy Products 
• Plant Sanitation 
• Forest Inspectory 
• Land Office, Office for Agriculture 
 • Ministry of Defence  
Defence Replacement Headquarters  
 • Ministry of Justice 
 • Ministry of Industry and Trade 
  • Regional Offices of State Energy Security Supervisory Board 
• Consumer Protection 
• Office of Geology 
• Office for Measure Calibrating 
• Mining Office 
 • Ministry of Environmental and Regional Development 
  • Environmental Supervisory Office 
• Directorate of Nature Conservation 
• Directorate of National Parks 
• Offices of Regional Chief Architect 
 • Ministry of Transport, Communication and Water Conservancy 
  • County Transport Supervisory Office 
• Telecommunication Supervisory Offices 
• Regional Water Management Directorates 
• Public utilities, companies for road maintenance 
 • Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 • Ministry of Culture and Education 
 • Ministry of Labour 
  • Supervisory Offices of Labour Security and Labour 
• Labour Centre 
 • Ministry of Public Welfare 
  • Regional Public Health Service 
 • Ministry of Finance 
  • Directorate of Public Taxation and Control 
 • Central Statistical Office 
  • Directorate of Statistics 
 • Economic Competition Office 
Note: In the figure, we do not show the central and regional organs of the Frontier Guards, the 
Police, penal authorities, the National Security Office (Ministry of Home Affairs) and the 
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 Customs Office (Ministry of Finance) as armed bodies and the organs of Ministry of 
Defence. 
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 of the legislation relating to county assemblies, there is no other way but 
creating a disperse organisation since county governments were not allowed to 
undertake tasks which might create a hierarchy in their relationship with the 
municipalities. Without going into details of the system, it is necessary to point 
out, that the government willingly decreased the competencies of the self-
governments in fields where the nature of the task theoretically would have 
require an elected county body. Some of the newly established deconcentrated 
organs proved to be superfluous or malfunctioning. There is a great deal of 
parallel functions and a lack of co-ordination within the territorial 
administration while important functions remained in abeyance. Especially in 
regional development and labour market administration the bureaucratic and 
hierarchic functioning of the state and the organisational model were 
disadvantageous as compared with the local governmental model. These 
phenomena undoubtedly proved the fact that as resuming office, the gov-
ernment did not have a conscious concept of state construction or if it did it 
were unable to put it into practice. 
If we examine more carefully the method of power delegation, we will find 
that the decision-making authority shifted upwards in the hierarchy with 
complete disregard for the local governments. 
The meso-tier integration was absent in the structure of territorial 
government. An information, development and management centre would have 
been required which is capable of flexibly representation and co-ordination of 
the autonomous actors in the economic and local governmental sphere, bearing 
their local and regional interests in mind, but without a direct profit orientation. 
However, the government made some efforts to establish a kind of medium 
tier co-ordination unit for public administration. For this sake the government 
assigned in 1990 the so-called prefects of the republic in eight regions, which 
were created specially for this aim. Yet, the prefects of the republic had to face 
the general lack of trust and popularity, among others for the reason that they 
tried to practice a kind of prefectoral power against the local governments 
enjoying the “ecstasy” of freedom. The governmental representative (which 
used to be called historically Lord Lieutenant) with great traditions in 
Hungarian public administration lost its quasi-political character. In 1994 the 
position was reintegrated in the county system where he carried out rather 
lawfulness control and appeal authority tasks. 
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 2.4 Lack of associations 
The low efficiency of the rather small municipalities of the Latin countries is 
balanced with the system of associations and the assistance of the medium tier. 
In Hungary in spite of the fragmentation of municipalities the associations are 
fairly rare in the local and micro-regional level. The fact that the counties lost 
their influence would not be so painful if the towns or settlements with central 
functions could take their role, i.e. assume the responsibility for integration 
within the area or the settlements around the town. The law provides this 
possibility but no means oblige the cities and villages to associate and in fact 
they did not seem to be motivated at all. The former settlement development 
policy and service management practice before 1990 granted only public 
administrative status to functions of settlements; the higher status went together 
with the responsibility for supplies defined on a normative basis. The cities and 
settlements in the surrounding were in 1984 organised in a common 
administrative unit, yet no real, vital contact could be established. Towns were 
not able to implement a real administrative integration even in the old regime 
and by now they have completely given up this ambition. In our survey in 1994 
and 1998 the results showed that the settlements only associated under the 
pressure of necessity or in many cases not at all (Table 3–4). 
Table 3 
Number of the settlements (districts) participating in associations (1992) 
 Number of 
Settlements 
Associations for 
administrative 
tasks 
Associations
for Services 
Provision 
Other Common body 
of 
Representatives 
Total 3135 923 411 77 57 
Source: Ministry of Interior, 1992. 
Table 4 
Number of settlements (districts) participating in associations (1999) 
 Number of 
settlements 
Associations for 
administrative tasks 
   Number of municipalities 
participating in an association 
Total 3135 1430 2439 
Source: Ministry of Interior, 1999. 
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 They rather negotiate informally with the local government providing for a 
service for them when employing the service. Similarly, the interviews revealed 
that the majority of towns failed in establishing deliberate relationships with 
their surrounding. Even if contacts were established, this happened usually not 
on the basis of the recognition of mutual interests, the co-operations are mainly 
motivated by transitional financing difficulties and cases of necessity. The tiny 
villages located in urban attraction zones preferred smaller decentralised areas 
as their administrative partners. We could not discover any association, which 
was able to co-ordinate a whole urban surrounding unit. Several associations 
were established but they all focused on single issue, like a certain investment 
development, the improvement of infrastructure, or various development 
projects, but there seemed to be no need for general, comprehensive co-
operation or joint planning. 
By 1994 we could find a relatively high number of voluntary established so 
called micro-regional associations. They usually set the target of developing the 
local economy and infrastructure. They will gain importance first after the Act 
on Regional Development and Physical Planning, yet we will come back to this 
matter later (Table 5–6). 
Table 5 
Situation of micro-regional development associations in 1994 
Location Associations Number of 
organisations 
 With their seat in a having a having no
 town village 
No 
data 
city as a member 
No 
data 
Total number of 
organisations 
Totally 62,0 58,0 20,0 93,0 44,0 3,0 140,0 
Percentage of the total 
number 
44,3 41,4 14,3 66,4 31,4 2,2 100,0 
Source: Pálné Kovács, I. 1994. 
Table 6 
Situation of micro-regional development associations in 1999 
Totally 263 micro–regional organisations of which 
52.0% are associations of local governments without legal personality 
14.1% associations with legal personality 
28.0% civil organisations 
5.9% other 
 20 
 Source:  G. Fekete, É. 1999. 
 
Yet, prior to the introduction of the Act the general aversion to planning and 
to co-operation was characteristic, but obviously the legislation on associations 
also contributed to lack of motivation to associate. The Act on Local 
Governments recognised the importance of associations and considered them as 
legal entities. But the regulation was not elaborated in detail in order to 
surmount the gap between the fragmented local decision making system and the 
services and infrastructure organised by districts. For lack of comprehensive 
and clear regulations local governments are obviously anxious about losing 
their autonomy to an organisation capable of taking. Therefore they fail to 
realise the advantages and the necessity of association.  
The rise of the disintegration process was actually not the government's 
responsibility, rather the consequence of the weaknesses of the Act on Local 
Governments as well as of the political pressure behind the regulations of the 
act. The government looked on the disintegration process inactively. The 
handicaps resulting from disintegration were gradually realised. Several reform 
ideas were formulated within the central government to reverse the than 
situation. The ministries of regional development and labour recognised and 
supported the integration of smaller regions, as mentioned above. 
Summarising, the Act on Local Governments had tremendous importance in 
the construction of the Hungarian democratic state structure. Local communities 
were given a wide scope of competencies and autonomy and therefore they 
became important schools of democratic political learning. Yet, the Act was 
despite its liberalism unable to guarantee the decentralisation of state 
administration and organisation, thus the local self-government sector could 
not become a dominant element of territorial administration. 
Generally, the Act can be evaluated as very progressive with the remark that 
in many aspects it only outlines the frameworks of functioning not considering 
on the other hand the following circumstances: 
• In the division of functions, the border between the state and local govern-
ments should have been made more unambiguous, as a protection against 
the inevitably expanding central power. The Act on Local Governments 
created only the frameworks but did not filled them with competencies 
and means of implementation, means of the so-called simple laws and 
government decrees. 
• The autonomy of local governments requires not only rights but political 
and economic guarantees too, since without them the autonomy can be no 
more than formal legal fact. 
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 • Local societies and politicians were not yet prepared for the liberty given 
to local governments and this inevitably led to functional disturbances. 
The institutional system of training and retraining of the staff of local 
authorities has not been implemented to date, although this would have 
been highly necessary because of the transformation. 
3 The regional development policy before 1996 
The contradictory structure of the medium tier, the lack of territorial self-
government not only caused disturbances in territorial administration but 
contributed to the over centralisation of the government's regional development 
policy. The government recognised the political importance of managing 
regional inequity, but  
• was unable to formulate a consistent regional policy;  
• did not clarify competencies within the government; and  
• represented a paternalistic regional development policy with unclear 
objectives. 
A consistent regional development policy was also hindered by a number of 
branches interfering with local processes in a rather uncoordinated way. 
The competencies of regional development within the government were not 
clear. Regional development activity in most countries is unable to gain enough 
political weight to be undertaken by an independent ministry. In Hungary due to 
rivalry within the government this governmental activity was for decades 
divided into settlement development and regional development even though 
exactly these activities require strict co-ordination. 
Even though regional policy had an independent ministry for itself, the 
Ministry for Environment Protection and Regional Development, however, the 
Ministry's weight within the government was rather less compared to sectoral 
departments or to the Ministry of Interior supervising local authorities. 
Almost all the branches undertook settlement and regional development 
activities in a dual organisation system.  
• A number of ministries set up their own departments of regional develop-
ment, which launched tenders for targeted support for local authorities. 
• The “second line” was the functioning of the county-level deconcentrated 
organisations of ministries. One type of the deconcentrated organs, the so-
called state commissioner was particularly important in terms of regional 
development. The role of the state commissioner was varying in the 
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 county tier crisis-treatment programmes initiated by the central 
government. Yet, the common feature of the role of the prefects of the 
republic was, that they we eager to keep county assemblies far away from 
the decision-making. The government assigned different ministries with 
the management of the certain crisis counties and prefects of the republic 
were to organise the local implementation. Later, the prefects of the 
republic set up various committees and consultative organs (with no 
public legal control whatsoever) to “legitimise” their decisions.  
• The next stage was the establishment of the development councils with the 
participation of central and local actors once again with uncertain public 
legal background.  
In 1993 government policy became more transparent owing to the 
strengthening significance and regulation of the Regional Development Fund. 
Parliament passed a resolution about the guidelines of regional development 
allocations and the eligibility of assisted regions. 
The government's explicit regional development policy was formulated 
essentially in the county programmes. The common feature of these 
programmes was that the government launched or stopped them based on its 
unilateral decisions. This method followed misdirected, paternalistic traditions. 
The county assemblies (self-governments) were excluded from the preparation 
and implementation of county programmes. 
In financing regional and settlement development the centralisation by the 
government was extreme. The efficiency of financing regional and settlement 
development was deteriorated by the dominance of targeted central support, the 
lack of co-ordination between branches and the poor ability of territorial 
partnerships to enforce interests. The efficiency of regional development policy 
was deteriorating due to the fact that the objectives of social assistance, crisis 
management and economic development were entangled, therefore the 
utilisation of allocations was inefficient. 
However, this functioning remained of spending public resources rather than 
of development activities. Supporting dynamic, innovative and enterprise 
promoting centres, which would have a strong influence on their environment 
and contribute to the country's economic growth, unfortunately did not feature 
among the objectives of regional development. Support should be granted to the 
poorest regions as an expression of solidarity and as a possible act of promoting 
the local economy instead of providing subsidies on purely social grounds. 
However, the chances of economic progress in backward areas were quite slim, 
at least prior to a countrywide low economic growth. 
The government's experts apparently did not realise the new regional 
processes in Hungary (which went on for twenty years in Western Europe), 
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 which will give rise to a regional organisation different than in the past few 
decades and which will enforce the improvement regional policy means and 
objectives (Enyedi, Gy.–Pálné Kovács, I. 1994).  
Despite of all these, the perspective of development was towards a decentral-
ised and multi-sectoral model in which not only regional and local governments 
but also other public bodies, direct administrative structures, actors of business 
and civil sectors will find a place. At the same time, it was hoped that the initial 
processes would transform the boundaries between the profit and non-profit 
sector. 
4 Reform of the local governmental system in 1994 
The national government realised, earlier than local authorities, the vacuum in 
the territorial integration, which was left behind by the fall of the counties. The 
lack of a territorial integrative organisation was especially disturbing in the 
government's operation because it coincided with the disintegration of the local 
governmental structure. 
Therefore government experts proposed the reconsideration and 
modification of the Act on Local Governments. The government's programme 
for updating public administration also proposed the reassessment of the 
deconcentrated organisational form. The experts of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs reinforced the significance of the improvement of the Act on Local 
Governments and proposed amendments were formulated. 
During the first governmental cycle local governments (especially small mu-
nicipalities) “got” a great deal from the government. However, along with the 
paternalistic attention number trends evolved suggesting that this policy will be 
on the long term unsuccessful in managing regional development problems or 
regional differences of public services. Organisational disintegration, the 
deterioration of the professionalism in public administration, the uniformity of 
infrastructure investments by local governments, unrefined administrative 
deconcentration, the unhealthy extent of central redistribution all become 
obstacles of the exploitation of the advantages of real decentralisation which is 
the great potential of the local governmental model. 
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 4.1 Slow integration  
The new government elected in 1994 tried to counteract one of the most contra-
dictory processes by measures suggesting a cautious but evidently more up-to-
date concept: 
• Legal prescribed requirements of the establishment of new municipalities 
became more rigorous. According to the modification settlements with 
less than 300 inhabitants may not receive the status of independent 
municipalities.  
• additional financial benefits were promised to self-governments 
associating with each other.  
In the wake of the autonomy of small settlement local governments it was 
necessary establish at least a basic infrastructure level (schools, city halls, water 
supply etc.). This admittedly brought about spectacular changes in the image of 
municipal self-governments and came as a revelation to the local population. In 
the same small settlements, the “enrichment of the public sector” was coupled 
with high unemployment and the shattering of the villages’ economic basis. 
Construction on one side, demolition on the other; and which of the trends 
would be lasting and how will they affect each other? What should be state 
resources used for? How can the local society of the settlements be convinced 
that autarchy and self-contained autonomy is insufficient way surmounting the 
crisis? Would the government assist for the long-term regression, if it supports 
“local egoism”? Which is the right model for the villages: traditionalism or 
modernisation? 
These questions are also inherent in amendments, which allegedly aim at ad-
ministrative rationality. It was a question, what economic management and 
development strategy should follow the rules suggesting conceptual change. 
Can the government undertake measures under the aegis of the “modernisation 
programme”, which will most probably be politically unpopular? It had a 
symbolic value that in the 1995 budget, a special contingency provides funding 
for associations established for the maintenance of primary school educational 
institutions and purchase of school buses instead of the former practice, 
individual school constructions. Government comments on the bankruptcy of 
self-governments also allude to previous wasteful investment decisions and 
admit that the resources for funding new institutions petered out. The 
modification of the grant system should also promote integration. These tiny 
signals forecast the integrative intention within the self-government system, 
which, however, met considerable political opposition and resistance on behalf 
of the self-governments.  
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 Nevertheless, the modernisation of the local government system in the devel-
oping countries indicate, that the structural reform or the generalisation of the 
associative system will be inevitable sooner or later. The vacillation of the 
government in other issues may bear the way of a more progressive regional 
and local development strategy when it comes to taking politically unpopular 
steps. The central government could motivate the association of municipalities 
first of all by financial regulation because the most important part of the local 
budget is coming from the central state despite that the proportion of local 
revenues increased within the local budgets (Table 7). 
The measures for the enhancement of the economy of scale considered as the 
administrative precondition of modernisation do not seem to be very successful 
from the perspective of ten years. Notwithstanding the parliament passed an 
independent act on the associations of local governments, but this new act was 
unable to motivate the settlements to co-operation. There were certain 
modifications in the financing too, which actually favoured associations in the 
course of the distribution of supports. The differentiated division of labour is 
encouraged by the trend, that currently larger local governments, especially 
those nearby the cities are assigned with district scale supply tasks. However as 
a whole the local governmental provision of tasks is still fragmented. 
Unfortunately no comprehensive survey was carried out on this topic either. 
The conclusion declared currently by the Hungarian Audit Office based on a 
representative survey is fairly characteristic: there is no information on the 
impacts of the decision-making competency related to the implementation of the 
3646 local governmental tasks and competencies. The above survey (with some 
20% representation) proves that the proportion of the associations in the 
organisation of public services was only 6,9% in 1999 (Hungarian Audit Office, 
2000). 
Table 7 
Local government budgets as % of total incomes between 1993–1997 
Incomes 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1999 
Beneficial income total 17.6 14.3 16.0 19.4 19.3 28.8 
From the foregoing: 
   Duties 
   Local taxes 
1.7
4.5 
1.2
4.1 
1.5
3.9 
1.4
7.7 
 
1.3 
8.0 
 
 
12.9 
surrendered income total 8.5 9.6 13.0 11.5 13.8 13.3 
From the foregoing: 
   Personal income tax 
   Car tax 
8.1
0.4 
9.2
0.4 
12.6
0.4 
10.7
0.7 
 
13.0 
0.8 
 
12.4 
0.7 
own and surrendered incomes totally 26.1 23.9 29.1 30.9 33.1 42.1 
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 Accumulation and capital income totally 8.1 10.0 9.4 9.7 8.6 8.3 
State grants and subsidies total 42.6 44.3 41.3 35.6 34.7 29.1 
From the foregoing: 
   Normative state grants 
   Designated and targeted subsidies 
   Personal income tax contribution 
35.6
3.0
1.1 
33.2
5.0
1.0 
31.3
4.5
 
24.6
3.2 
 
24.6 
3.7 
 
18.7 
2.5 
Social Security funds 15.2 11.5 13.3 16.0 16.2 13.7 
Other funds, repayments, bond repayment 3.8 1.7 2.8 3.9 3.4 4.0 
Credit, bond incomes 4.2 8.6 4.0 3.9 4.0 2.8 
Annual income total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Financial Review  1995. 1., 1997. 1., 2000. 9. 
4.2 Ambivalent strengthening of county assemblies 
One of the most important changes in the local government system was the 
introduction of the direct election system at the county level in order to 
strengthen the legitimacy of county government in 1994. The system of 
elections did not prove to be successful. At the same time the establishment of 
two artificial “constituencies” per county for the settlements with more or less 
than 10,000 inhabitants respectively appeared to solve or rather circumvented 
the problem of area delimitation within the county. These categories had 
nothing to do with interests within the county as they separated the town from 
its surrounding. This election system was definitely in contradiction with the 
intention of the government programme and left the representative proportions 
within the county assembly to sheer chance. In the course of the elaboration of 
the election technique the basic concept whereby the government recognises 
micro-regional associations within the counties and intends to rely on them in 
regional policy was completely forgotten. As a result of the unique election 
technique party politicians are in majority in the county assemblies, who can 
hardly satisfy their political ambitions having only restricted competencies and 
space of movement. It was a big mistake to create bodies with strong political 
legitimacy for the restrictedly increased number of competency and power. 
A positive legal dogmatic step was providing counties the status of 
“territorial government”, as a result of which the concept of division of 
competencies between the municipal and county level could have been 
reassessed. Unfortunately in spite of that, county governments did not receive 
an adequate amount of competencies and tasks even after modifying the 
election system and reinforcing their status, since both the municipalities and 
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 the ministries resisted during the reforms in 1994 granting the counties more 
significant competencies. 
Another sign of rationalisation was that the chairman and the chief 
administrator of the county assembly could be vested with sate administrative 
authority. According to the former legal dogmatic concept, county governments 
could not assume duties, which might create a hierarchy over local self-
governments. The former four years this rigid rule or principle was the pretext 
for the establishment of deconcentrated offices, i.e. the nationalisation of a 
significant part of territorial duties. The government’s objective to streamline 
and rationalise territorial level state administration could, in this way, be 
realised even if state administrative tasks are delegated to the competence of the 
county self-governments. 
4.3 Careful steps towards the integration of territorial state 
administration 
As already mentioned, directly after the new government assumed office and 
following the large political debate on the “prefects” symbolising the centralised 
state, the eight administrative regions of the prefects of the Republic were 
abolished. With this step the new government practically renounced the 
ambition of direct interference into local and territorial matters (Pálné Kovács, 
I. 1995). 
In 1996 the government announced a comprehensive program on the reform 
of public administration. The objective of the program was to rationalise and 
integrate the fragmented public administrative system in the territorial tier and 
to establish co-ordination through the offices of county assemblies replacing the 
former “prefects”. Four years after the announcement of the state administrative 
reforms we ought to admit that they were only partially successful. It is 
undeniable that the number of independent deconcentrated organs decreased, 
preliminary due to the integration of the territorial units under the supervision of 
the same ministry. Yet, county assemblies have only weak co-ordination means 
and more important tasks were not delegated (back) from the deconcentrated 
sector to the county assemblies. Therefore, the dominance of the 
state/deconcentrated sector in the territorial tier remained unchanged (Figure 
3). 
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 5 The act on regional development in 1996 
5.1 The regulation 
As regards regional power, besides the Act on Local Governments and the 
reforms of the state administrative system the most important and possibly most 
ambiguous step was the enactment of the Act on Regional Development and 
Physical Planning in 1996. The most important objectives the integration of the 
different branches in the economic and regional policy; the harmonisation of the 
environmental, labour market, infrastructure, housing and regional policies; and 
focus on the local resources and needs. These trends involved the necessity of 
the decentralisation of public administration and a more flexible management of 
regional policy establishing partnerships with the actors of the social and private 
sectors. The failures of the former regional policy were caused by the 
centralised administrative system neglecting the local actors in the regional 
development decision-making. Recognising this mistake the government 
undertook decentralisation. 
The different political and professional forums raised various requirements 
towards the slowly shaping act, which were finally included to the dominant 
principles of the act: 
• The government intended to create the foundations of one single regional 
policy operating under common rules, having a concept and covering the 
entire country – the principle of programming. 
• The advanced regions – in the name of efficiency – expected to be granted 
supplementary support for their further development – the principle of 
innovation and additionality. 
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 Figure 3  Central and Regional Public Administration in Hungary in 1998 
Ministries Their regional organs  
(in each county or region) 
 • Prime Minister's Office 
 • Ministry of Home Affairs 
  • County and Capital City Public Administrative Offices (20) 
• (Consumer Protection Inspectorates, Public Guardianship Offices, 
Property Transfer Committees) 
• Refugee and Migration Office 
• Territorial State Household and Administrative Information Services (19) 
• County and Local Fire Service 
• County and Capital City Civil Defence Headquarters 
 • Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
  • Headquarters of Veterinary and Food Inspection Services (20) 
• Territorial branches of National Compensation Bureau (13) 
• Stations for Plant Improvement and Soil protection (20) 
• State Forestry Services (10) 
• County and Capital City Land Registry Offices (20) 
• Offices of Agrarian Affairs (19) 
• Stations for Species Experiments (28+8) 
 Ministry of Defence  
 • Ministry of Justice 
 • Ministry of Economy 
  • Regional Offices of Technical Security Inspectorate (10) 
• Territorial Offices of Geology (7) 
• Offices for Measure Calibrating (20) 
• Mining Office (4) 
• Regional Secretariats of Tourism Committees (9) 
• by the parts of the ministry 
 • Ministry of Environmental Protection 
  • Environmental Supervisory Offices (12) 
• Directorates of National Parks (9) 
• Offices of Regional Chief Architect byparts of the ministry 
 • Ministry of Transport, Communication and Water Conservancy 
  • County Transport Supervisory Office (12) 
• Telecommunication Supervisory Offices (5) 
• Regional Water Management Directorates (12) 
 • Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 • Ministry of Culture and Education 
 • Ministry of the National Cultural Heritage 
 • Ministry of Youth and Sport 
 • Ministry of Social and Family Affairs 
  • County and Capital City Labour Offices (20) 
 • Ministry of Public Health 
  • Regional Public Health Service (20) 
 • Ministry of Finance 
  • Directorate of Public Taxation and Control (20) 
 • Central Statistical Office 
  • Territorial Directorates (20) 
Source: Verebély I., 1998. pp. 420–421. 
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 • The crisis regions expected the government to focus on their development 
– the principle of concentration. 
• The local governments of the small and tiny settlements were hoping to 
remain the beneficiaries of different grants – the principle of solidarity. 
• Economic actors wanted to participate in the shaping and financing of 
development policy as equal partners – the principle of partnership. 
• County governments required under the slogan of decentralisation the en-
largement of their competencies and resources – the principle of 
subsidiarity and decentralisation. 
The county assemblies were already disappointed as the act was passed. 
They in vain expected the Act on Regional Development and Physical Planning 
to arrange what only a norm of general political value, the Constitution and the 
Act on Local Governments could have arranged. Namely, they wished to 
receive a role in regional policy and to be integrated as real territorial bodies 
into the system of power. Their hopes were cherished by the fact that the 
European Chart of Regional Governments was already shaping at that time as 
well as the Declaration of the Assembly of European Regions. These documents 
predicted the European trend of strengthening of the medium tier 
administration. The still existing uncertainty about the decentralisation of power 
and the lack of trust towards county assemblies left their mark on the regulation 
of regional policy, as well.  
Although the government realised the advantages of decentralisation it re-
mained reluctant to share its competencies in regional policy with the directly 
elected county government. The legislator made efforts to eliminate the 
contradiction by introducing a special institution: the regional development 
councils – at four levels of regional policy systems (Figure 4). 
These partnership institutions and special agencies well known in Western 
Europe were established to integrate the regional development efforts of the 
local governments, state administration, economic and civil actors (Horváth, 
Gy. 1998). In some cases, they are even capable of working out common 
development programmes and to accumulate resources for the implementation 
of the programmes (Halkier, H. et al. 1998). However, they are unable to do one 
thing: to substitute territorial self-governments bearing political legitimacy and 
standing on the foundation of the principle of representation (Jones, M. 1998). 
During the establishment of the partnership institutions the “legitimacy danger” 
in connection with corporate organisations and the agencies and the weaknesses 
of the lacking transparency were not realised yet even though the literature 
regularly elaborates the topic  (Thynne, I. 2000). In Hungary the motivation was 
to avoid/ignore the elected county assembly by creating the territorial 
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 development councils, the principle of partnership was rather an excuse than 
target. 
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 In terms of public law it is difficult to define the nature of the territorial 
development councils since the legislator did not care to describe the precise 
type of organisations to be established under the name development council. 
This led to several practical problems in their operation i.e. in their financing, 
employment matters or legal control. It was for instance not clear whether the 
employees of these organisations are civil servants. Also, while the council 
enjoyed great freedom in the facilitation of its own organisation, decision–
making and resource distribution, no superior organisational control was 
established. 
The composition of the development council shows tripartite or corporate 
character, it is varying in the different tiers (like national, regional, county and 
micro-regional). County development councils for example, consist of one 
representative of the county assembly, one of the cities with county rank, 
representatives of micro-regional associations within the county (their number 
is fixed by law), representatives of employers (chambers) and the employees 
(trade unions) and finally  the representative of the ministry responsible for 
regional policy. The composition of the councils was more or less suitable to 
co-operate the activities of the concerned actors based on the principle of 
partnership. However the basic contradiction of the model is that these 
development councils were equipped with far more power and competencies 
than the directly elected county assemblies. County development councils 
decide upon the development concept of the county and are entitled to distribute 
state subsidies within an application system. At this place we have to remark, 
that partnership corporations or the quasi non-governmental organs (quangos) 
are expanding not only in regional policy but also in other branches (such as the 
management of tourism, education or water). There could even be a welcomed 
tendency if evaluated from the aspect that administration is becoming more 
flexible. Still we cannot disregard the political fact, that the central government 
is often led by the ambition to bypass the county assemblies. Further, the 
increase of the “quasi”, organs with an unstable status and less political legiti-
macy also harm the principle of transparency, makes co-ordination difficult and 
results in a deficit of democracy. The expansion of organisations with different 
status in the territorial tier represents fairly well the confusion in the territorial 
tier of Hungarian public administration. Deconcentrated organs, partnership 
organisations and other quango organisations replaced the weak self–
governments. 
In spite of announcing the requirements of EU compatibility in order to inte-
grate Hungarian territorial division into the NUTS system the Act was unable to 
launch and amplify the establishment of regions larger than counties. The act 
made the counties the dominant units of regional development and although it 
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 provided a possibility for the creation of regions larger than them it only made 
this compulsory in two regions, in the agglomeration of the capital city, 
Budapest and in the Lake Balaton region. The fundamental reason for the 
hesitation about the regions was the fact that in regionalisation not only 
political-power issues but also possible geographical borders are uncertain. The 
National Regional Development Concept of Hungary was passed by the 
Parliament at the spring of 1998. This document defined the number and 
borders of the NUTS 2 regions. However, the development councils established 
by the Act on Regional Development were not forced to be organised based on 
the NUTS 2 regions. These councils did not receive resources or competencies 
exactly due to the voluntary principle. The county development councils still 
have the right to decide upon the geographic “region” they want to establish a 
common regional development council and further the competencies and tasks 
they want to endow them (Figure 5). 
5.2 The first experiences of functioning of the regional policy 
The enactment of the Act resulted in fairly significant changes as regards the ac-
tors of territorial administration. However the new system has been functioning 
only for a few years now. The balance of the first experiences contained both, 
positive and negative phenomena.  
Strengths 
• There was a special institutional network and some decentralised fund for 
regional development. 
• A fairly positive phenomenon was that public and private actors of 
regional policy are motivated to co-operate with each other. 
• The system encouraged partnerships between rural settlements and urban 
centres in the framework of micro-regional associations. 
• The central government had to communicate with the territorial actors in 
planning and in the redistribution of resources. 
• The public sector, particularly local governments had to begin to plan 
their activities due to the Act on Regional Development and Physical 
Planning obliging them to prepare regional development plans. 
• The attitude of the local and actors and branches (ministries) was 
changing, spatial aspects are becoming more important elements in the 
development decisions. 
• The partial decentralisation of development recourses increased the effi-
ciency of regional policy. 
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 Weakness 
• No territorial information system has been established yet for the creation 
of development plans and the evaluation of the implementation. 
• Skills and experts were insufficient in territorial planning. 
• There was a huge scarcity of recourses for regional policy not only due to 
the economic situation but also to the fact that ministerial departments 
have more power and the resources than the actors of regional policy. 
• Large regions were the weakest among the territorial planning units due to 
the uncertainty of geographical boundaries, willingness of county 
development councils to co-operate with each other is quite low and the 
there is still a lack of own competencies, means and recourses. 
• The local actors were more motivated by short-term targets and equity 
than the requirement of efficiency and modernisation, and therefore the 
danger is real that resources will be fragmented. 
6 The agenda of the territorial reforms 
Summarising: notwithstanding the Act on Regional Development launched 
significant integration processes, the problem of territorial power division has 
not yet been solved since the systemic change. The meso-level is “floating” and 
neither professional nor political answers can be given to the following 
questions: 
• Do we really want to decentralise power in this country where 
centralisation has strong and long traditions? 
• What tasks shall the missing medium tier overtake? 
• How many territorial tiers are at all necessary in Hungary? 
• Which are the geographic borders of the new territorial division? 
A characteristic feature of the debate over the counties in the past decade is 
that it often appears as a merely spatial division issue hiding the real political 
and power correlation. The “anti-county group” stopped arguing that 
municipalities are able to provide all local functions thus the medium level is 
unnecessary. They argue now that the millennium-old counties are not capable 
any more of carrying out medium level tasks. The notions differ when it comes 
to the question whether they are too small or too large. The answer evidently 
depends on what tasks we want to render to the medium level. The county-
debate sometimes votes for large regions other times for urban attraction zones, 
usually neglecting or concealing the political consequences. 
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 6.1 Reform alternatives for territorial division to replace the 
“too small” or “too large” counties 
The “city-county” (micro-regional) alternative. Following the systemic change 
the independence of the settlements became the ultimate political interest, the 
greatest achievement of system of local governments. Naturally, the favouring 
of independence of the settlements, the »l’art pour l’art« freedom could not 
stand long against proficiency and efficiency. It was soon realised that the 
system fragmented into 3200 autonomous decision-making bodies is struggling 
with malfunctions. The point of the model proposing the so-called town-
counties against the counties is that the municipalities will be able to carry out 
their administrative and service functions in co-operation with the towns. The 
notion of the towns co-operating with their environs is of course not new either 
in the literature or in the history of Hungarian public administration. The 
popular political scientist of Hungary, István Bibó, and Ferenc Erdei 
researching already in the period between the two World Wars elaborated in 
1947 a concept on replacing the counties by the so called town–counties. The 
popularity of the programme published under the aegis of the National Peasant 
Party was not so much due to the rearrangement of the territorial system but 
rather to the fact, that this model was the only competitive alternative to the 
soviet model of the Communist Party. The so-called districts have existed for 
centuries in the Hungarian territorial public administration. Their scope was 
fairly similar to the proposed town-counties but the districts – with the 
exception of a short period between 1954–1971 – never had representative 
content, thus they have never been self-governments either but the 
administrative units of the counties. In 1984 the system of so-called urban zones 
was introduced to replace the districts but these units have never had a wide 
range of functions and representation. Public administration building on urban 
attraction zones responses to the need of providing services for the population 
and manage administrative affairs of the citizens in the geographical vicinity. 
These tasks appear in the urban attraction zone in close correlation. The close 
twinning of towns and their neighbourhood in the servicing and infrastructure 
does not necessarily require an independent public administrative tier. The more 
flexible associations of the concerned local governments are rather suitable to 
implement and co-ordinate common tasks. In my opinion, the urban attraction 
zones are not alternatives but complements to the counties. The geographical 
scale appears lately more often in the local governmental performance of tasks. 
Under the supervision of the government district offices were set up within the 
appointed urban local governments, which are authorised to issue different 
licences and certificates. The so-called micro-regional associations proved to be 
 38 
 especially viable, which integrate the development activities of the local 
governments. Encouraged by these experiences the issue of institutionalising 
the micro–regions as public administrative units was raised again. 
Regions above or instead of the counties. From the historical review it is 
clear that regional (a region here means a unit larger than the county) divisions 
have no traditions in Hungary. When any attempt appeared to introduce a 
regional division different from the counties the motivation was always 
centralisation, to break down the national independence opposition and to 
empty the political content of the county frames. It is also obvious that none of 
the regionalisation attempts proved to be successful, the counties repelled all 
attacks. Despite the region is not an unknown category of public law since 
organisations with regional competencies have been operating for a long time in 
the different sectors of public administration (such as in the field of 
environment protection, water and mining management). Behind the debates 
over the counties in the recent years we can feel the distrust of the government 
and its reluctance to enable the counties to become strong political-power 
counter-poles. In some cases there is nothing more behind the “Europe of the 
Regions” slogan but the mere rejection of the counties or any power unit 
between the top and the bottom. Until 1999, the modification of Act on 
Regional Development there was quite a huge confusion concerning the 
number and delimitation of the regions. Naturally, without the authority and 
political content for regions it cannot be decided how many levels are necessary 
and whether regions should be organised above or instead of the counties 
(Pálné Kovács, I. 1997). And naturally without having clarified the content it is 
not possible to debate reasonably on the geographical borders. 
6.2 The failure of the reform debates – Concealment of 
political aspects 
The parties and professionals have been struggling with the concept of power 
division at the territorial tier, yet a full consensus seems to be very hard to 
achieve. The future of the counties, more exactly the medium tier is now subject 
to significant debates. Although these debates seem to be about whether 
counties, town-counties, (micro–regions) or regions are the territorial division 
of the future, the matter is far more complex: the question is, whether a 
decentralised or a centralised state structure should or must be created in 
Hungary intending to join the EU. The idea of federalism does not even occur 
to the bravest reformers, which is understandable as the spatial structure, ethnic 
composition and size of Hungary does not require a federal arrangement, yet the 
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 necessity of the medium–tier is not disputed any more. Everyone seems to agree 
with the purpose of decentralisation, as it would not be elegant for the central 
power to narrow-mindedly stick to its power. The Hungarian answer is 
undoubtedly urged by the process, according to which in the neighbouring 
countries the regional reforms gathered a momentum after a long hesitation 
(Regulskí, J. 1998). Despite of the superficial affirmation of decentralisation, if 
examined deeper those concerned, we will find that the counter-interested are 
in majority against those for decentralisation: 
• We cannot expect any politician in the central government (and especially 
not in the sectoral departments) to support with belief the restriction of 
their own power by a regional level on which of course they would have 
rather less influence on. 
• The municipalities who just tasted freedom are very distrustful with any 
new tier “above” them, even if this would function as their self-
governmental body.  
• The most of the citizens do not understand why further bureaucratic tier 
spending their taxes is necessary. 
• The technocrats of public administration might accept that regional 
administration and co-ordination are necessary but they are definitely 
reluctant to let the non-professional representatives of a democratically 
elected political body interfere in “professional” issues. 
It is not at all easy to achieve real decentralisation, when the freedom of 
settlements, which they already enjoyed is cut, but based on the experience of 
ten years we have to accept that the freedom of settlements is not able to 
guarantee in itself the decentralisation of the system. The Hungarian Act on 
Local Governments, which are very liberal in public political sense were not 
able to guarantee the spatial decentralisation of power. With a bit of cynicism we 
can say that the government, supporting the demand of the settlements for 
autonomy and autarchy, applied the principle of “divide et impera” as the (often 
counter) interests of the 3200 settlements can be easily tackled without a spatial 
integration linking the settlements. Still, the strengthening of the territorial 
political–local governmental tier proceeded not only in the interest of the 
settlements but also of the central government, as: 
• the central decision-making is not able to receive sufficient information 
without regional partners; 
• the bureaucratic and centralising state administration is not able to get 
social support or legitimacy for its decisions; 
• the centralised and bureaucratic, uniform decision-making system is 
unable to mobilise local resources for the national priorities; 
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 • a more elaborate decision structure is more flexible and better at adapting 
to the changing requirements; 
• the centralised system has significantly weaker connections to the society 
and is less democratic which in turn jeopardises its legitimacy. 
These arguments, however, are too technocratic to be satisfactory for settling 
the debate over the counties, or regions eliminating the centralising reflexes and 
weakening distrust and prejudices. 
Summarising, we can say that the conceptual steps of the governments were 
favourable from the aspect of modernisation, rationalisation, democratic 
structure, increasing political weight and real decentralisation of power. By the 
comprehensive amendment and reform of the self-government and of the 
territorial administrative system and the legislation of regional policy, the 
Hungarian state-development process was pushed towards decentralisation. This 
will, in the longer term, provide self-governments with more favourable 
conditions and larger space of movement than the former paternalistic and 
centralising government policy. At the same time, specific techniques, actual 
measures of the governments were not always unambiguous; political 
compromises and branch aspirations inserted sources of danger in the operation, 
which can deteriorate the chances of implementation of the original ideas. The 
efficiency of the new order of regional policy, the advantages of 
decentralisation of planning and decisions making on regional development are 
connected with the general trends of public administration and governmental 
policy. We can say that the chance of successful regional policy depends on the 
success of Hungarian decentralisation process and economic development 
7 The story since 1998 – the regionalisation – 
ultimate chance? 
New government – old dilemmas 
The new government proclaimed by 1998 a more resolute regionalisation. Ac-
cording to the government programme the possibility of the introduction of re-
gional public administration shall be examined by the year 2000. The 
government submitted the proposal for the modification of the Act on Regional 
Development and Physical Planning to the Parliament. According to this it is 
compulsory to establish regional development councils for the territory of the 
NUTS 2 regions. The aim is to create regions, which meet the regional 
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 assistance requirements of the EU and will become the strongest level in the 
regional policy. 
The balance of the modification of the Act on Regional Development is not 
explicitly positive from the aspect of the requirements of EU accession. The 
government, parallel to increasing the space of the regional tier development 
policy, expanded its own power. The modification of the act violated even two 
of the principles of the European Union: the decentralisation (subsidiarity) and 
the partnership. 
Namely, the government modified the composition of the development 
councils: interestingly the labour councils, as the representatives of the 
employees and the economic chambers, as the representatives of the employers 
did not receive representation in the councils. Also, the representation of the 
micro–regions functioning as the associations of municipalities was decreased. 
Notwithstanding it was a positive development that finally the mayors of the 
county seats are members in the councils, but the changes led to the situation 
that the representatives of the government acquired the majority within the 
councils, since in the regional tier 10 ministries receive representation in the 
council. The regional and the county development councils are not any more 
decentralised only deconcentrated organs if their composition is considered, 
even if they maintained some of their local representative character. These 
changes worn us that the uncertain and intermediate status organs, as the 
beneficiaries or rather the subjects of decentralisation would hardly mean a safe 
constitutional solution, since they lacking the constitutional value and 
guaranties of self-governance may fall victim any time to the centralisation 
ambitions of the central government. 
We may come to a similar conclusion if we consider the public 
administration–organisation measures of the central government. The 
government undoubtedly announced its regionalisation programme within its 
public administrative programme. There are investigations carried out to 
identify the fields of the deconcentrated administration, where regional 
integration would be possible which is if possible within the frameworks of the 
statistical regions. Therefore the administrative and other public servicing 
organisations were ab ovo equipped with regional competency. Yet the question 
is, whether the process of regionalisation will continue towards public 
administrative or political regions? 
In the present state of the debates it is difficult to forecast the future since re-
gionalisation seems to lack both sufficient professional arguments and a unified 
political will. Notwithstanding we are professionally not prepared for a total re-
gional revision and reform, still in recent times demanding regionalisation is be-
coming rather a fashion in the groves of politics. The opposition parties argue 
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 besides the EU accession that if the regional tier will be the key element in 
regional development regional decision-making must be democratised as well. 
They justly refer to the fact, that the regional tier serves alongside the recent 
governmental intentions exclusively centralisation targets. 
The danger of inpatient regionalisation is not only in the lack of professional 
basis. A further, fairly important factor is that the regional identity is also 
absent. This latter is especially important, of course, if regions are organised as 
political units functioning on the principle of representation. It was in vain to 
emphasise the necessity of regionalisation and to establish regions within the 
state administration and regional development, if the population cannot identify 
emotionally or cognitively with these arbitrary units. Even their name deliver 
basis for debates, and their seats has not been clarified either. The government 
namely, as delimitation the regions and made the establishment of development 
councils compulsory did not make a decision on the seats of the regions. Ever 
since, there is a savage fight between the potential regional seats for acquiring 
the regional functions, institutions and organisations. 
Summarising we can declare that behind regionalism, the magic notion of 
the political elite there is no conscious region building strategy. In order to 
elaborate this strategy the following matters must be clarified.  
1. The functions requiring regions larger than the counties must be identified 
and defined. No systematic investigations were carried out in this respect, which 
based on the aspects of the economy of scale could have clarified the fields of 
the current system of public administrative tasks, which would require or at 
least is able to adapt the regional scale. For the time being certain programmes 
and tasks of regional development require regional scale, we can also consider 
the possibility of regionalising environmental protection and tourism. In the 
fields of public health, higher education or public administration there are some 
functions, which can be regionalised, but as a whole they do not fortify yet the 
necessity of the establishment of a separate administrative tier. 
2. After the clarification of the functions we must define, whether these 
functions require a new regional level with general authority, whether this tier 
should be facilitated instead of or above the counties and whether smaller 
regional units below the counties shall be created. In order to be able to decide 
upon these questions the territorial aspect of service systems, infrastructure, 
accessibility must be analysed. Accordingly, at the time being, it is not obvious 
that micro-regions, the 158 statistical urban attraction zones necessarily have to 
be the “lower meso–tier”, since the spatial organisation of the district scale 
services and administrative activities shows many different varieties. Their 
number is rather higher than 158, which obviously implies that the 
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 establishment of micro–regions would not mean an appropriate solution for the 
integration of regional administration, it could only provide for the voluntary 
framework of the municipal co-operation. It is especially important to consider 
whether in Hungary two medium tiers are necessary at all. The Western 
European experiences imply that usually the smaller countries like Hungary 
content themselves with one medium tier. 
3. After having identified the number of functions and levels the legal status 
of the region can be modelled: 
• state administrative units with an administrative office controlled by the 
gove 
• rnment, 
• special delegated organs with co-ordinating authority, 
• associations of local and county governments, 
• a kind of corporation, similar to the county and regional development 
councils 
• a directly elected self government with strong authority, or 
• a “member state” within a federalised structure. 
It is easily imaginable that in a classic unitarian country lacking regional 
traditions the fully authorised self–governmental status shall be achieved 
gradually. The example of Great–Britain shows, that filling up the standard 
regions with political–democratic content is also possible through special 
“preparatory” forms (Harding, A. et al. 1999). 
4. Having identified the content and the number of the levels, the 
geographical alternatives can be worked out. In this respect the appointment of 
regional centres is especially important. The enforcement of geographic 
rationality does not promise to be an easy task. The Hungarian space is 
differentiated by the settlement structure. It is almost impossible to build 
proportional regions on the settlements with the regional centre located in the 
geographic middle. Therefore it is important to build the administration on the 
real order of the regional spatial relationships, and it is also worthy to consider 
to establish regions with possibly different status (several examples of which 
exist in Europe). 
5. Subsequent to the scientific elaboration of reform alternatives, a public 
consensus must be achieved for the decision, as I am convinced, the regional 
division of the power cannot be an internal affair of either the narrow 
professional sphere or the government. For this reason the gradual introduction 
and the conscious nourishment of regional identity are especially important. 
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 As these tasks forecast implementation will take time. A hastily made, badly 
prepared and forced regionalisation may have the same fate as the former 
reforms, in addition, it would endanger the stability of the power of the 
governments struggling with a host of social and economic problems. 
However, until the accomplishment of the process of regionalisation in Hun-
gary counties will remain the regions, since counties are the only units in 
Hungary that meet – yet partially – the requirements of the European Charter of 
Regional Governments. 
* * * 
In Hungary the most essential issue is not whether the counties or regions 
should make the sub-national level. The primary task is to get rid of the 
traditions of state centralisation and formulate a political will for the 
decentralisation of the power. 
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